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Does Prison Reform Bring Sentencing Reform? The 
Congress, the Courts, and the Structural Injunction 
Brian K. Landsberg* 
The structural suit is one in which a judge, confronting a state 
bureaucracy over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to 
restructure the organization to eliminate a threat to those values posed 
by the present institutional arrangements.1 
The structural injunction recognizes the bureaucratic nature of the 
modern state.2 
A classic metaphor for a polycentric problem is a spider web, in which 
the tension of the various strands is determined by the relationship 
among all the parts of the web, so that if one pulls on a single strand, the 
tension of the entire web is redistributed in a new and complex pattern.3 
This is a symposium on sentencing reform, but I was asked to write about 
prison reform litigation. These seem like two independent areas of reform. Still, 
one could argue that the two are inextricably intertwined, since prisons flow from 
sentences of confinement and those sentences rely on the availability of a place 
of confinement. So that is a connection that this Article explores. It is a 
connection that Congress addressed in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PLRA) which, perhaps unwittingly, validated the structural injunctions in cases 
attacking conditions of confinement as unconstitutional. And it is a connection 
that lies not far beneath the surface of the California prison reform case, Brown v. 
Plata.4 Both the statute and the decision in Plata are more than what appears on 
the surface.5 
Prisoners in California’s state prison system brought suit to attack the grossly 
inadequate mental and physical medical care provided to them during their 
confinement.6 The suits did not attack California’s draconian sentencing laws; it 
 
*  Many thanks to Gerald Caplan for his valuable suggestions. Thanks, as well, to Robert Mayville and 
Ryan Matthews for research and editing assistance. 
1. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
2 (1979) [hereinafter The Forms of Justice]. 
2. OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 528 (2d ed. 1984). 
3. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 
91 YALE L.J. 635, 645 (1982), quoted in Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01–1351TEH, 2005 WL 2932253, at 
*25 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
4. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1997); Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1910. 
6.  Plata, 131 S.Ct. at 1922 (2011). 
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is doubtful that a constitutional attack on those laws would have succeeded.7 The 
PLRA sought to impose strict limits on remedies in cases like Brown v. Plata 
attacking prison conditions.8 However, despite these limitations, the Court in 
Brown v. Plata issued an order requiring the reduction of the prison population in 
California.9 Some may regard the result as a form of sentencing reform.10 This 
result flows from the convergence of a structural injunction, a resistant state 
government, and the constraints on federal court power: the Court could not 
effectively order the construction of new prisons to remedy the overcrowding 
that was arguably at the root of the unconstitutional medical conditions. 
For this symposium on sentencing reform, this article uses the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata11 as a platform to consider the 
relationship between traditional structural injunctions, Congressional legislation, 
and prison sentences. In adopting the PLRA, Congress reacted to a perceived 
excess of structural injunctions flowing from findings that conditions of 
confinement in prisons violated constitutional norms.12 The PLRA creates 
procedural and substantive requirements for entry of a “prisoner release order,” 
but it largely replicates the law of structural injunctions and, contrary to the 
dissents in Plata,13 places toothless limits on relief. The order under appeal in 
Plata seems to fall within the PLRA’s definition of a prisoner release order, and 
the Court held that it complied with the PLRA.14 Experience under Plata suggests 
that the prison cases are at best a crude and indirect method of sentencing 
reform.15 Sentencing reform should be based on careful legislative review of 
sentencing laws, rather than on the need to provide a constitutional minimum of 
medical and mental health care. Yet the judicial findings in the California cases 
may lead to demand for sentencing reform,16 and the relief in those cases may 
lead to changes in the length of time prisoners serve and may lead to their 
 
7. Even in the area of the death penalty, the Supreme Court has only found certain instances of the death 
penalty unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Constitution, based on 
disproportionality of the punishment. E.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 815 (1988) (holding the 
death penalty cruel and unusual as applied to a fifteen year old); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982) 
(holding the death penalty cruel and unusual as applied to someone satisfying the mens rea for robbery, but not 
murder). 
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1997). 
9.  Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1946. 
10. Michael Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration: Why is California Lagging Behind?, 28 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1275, 1294–98 (2012). 
11. 131 S. Ct. at 1910. The Supreme Court opinion reviews an order in two consolidated lower court 
cases, Coleman v. Brown and Plata v. Brown. This article refers to both cases as Plata. 
12.  Alicia Bower, Comment, Unconstitutionally Crowded: Brown v. Plata and How the Supreme Court 
Pushed Back to Keep Prison Reform Litigation Alive, 45 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 555, 565 (2012). 
13.  Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950–68 (Scalia, J. and Alito dissenting). 
14. Id. at 1937. 
15.  See Steven Nauman, Note, Brown v. Plata: Renewing the Call to End Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing, 65 FLA. L. REV. 855, 880 (2013).  
16.  See id. at 879. 
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diversion to jails rather than prisons—arguably a sort of sentencing reform. Thus, 
while no court in a case challenging prison conditions has ordered the state to 
“reform your sentencing laws or policies,” it may be worthwhile to examine the 
relationship between prison reform and sentencing reform. 
I. THE STATEWIDE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION 
The prison cases, much like the school desegregation cases that blazed a trail 
for structural injunctions, have their genesis in the creation of a legal duty.17 For 
example, the Supreme Court agreed in 1976 that prisoners had a right to adequate 
health care,18 a ruling that undergirds the lower court findings of violations in the 
Plata cases.19 Conditions of confinement in prisons in Alabama, Texas, and 
Arkansas gave rise to the early structural injunctions against prison systems.20 In 
Arkansas, the initial decrees were simple prohibitions on continuation of 
unconstitutional practices, such as whipping prisoners, and imposing other 
corporal punishment of prisoners without adequate safeguards.21 After five years 
of litigation, the federal district court in Arkansas, faced with truly horrific 
conditions, looked to the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clauses of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments to find a right to minimally 
adequate conditions of confinement.22 At that point, the court eschewed looking 
at each separate condition individually and adopted a totality of the 
circumstances test.23 Nor did they examine separately each prisoner’s situation.24 
The test can be criticized as murky. The totality of circumstances test, applied to 
the prison population as a whole, had a profound impact on the remedy.25 
Remedy tended to follow a familiar trajectory. Remedy flows from violation. 
“As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the 
remedy.”26 The Court has never said that a structural violation could go without 
remedy, although in one notable case its finding that there was no structural 
violation seemed to flow from its conclusion that the courts were not competent 
 
17. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court 
Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558–59 (2006). 
18. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
19. See Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2014) 
20. Schlanger, supra note 17, at 569–70 n.71. 
21. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F.Supp. 683, 689 (E.D. Ark. 1965). 
22. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 364 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (Holt II). See also, Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. 
Supp. 804, 816 (E.D. Ark 1967); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580–81 (8th Cir. 1968); Courtney v. Bishop, 
409 F.2d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir. 1969); and Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 826 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Holt I) for 
cases in Arkansas in the intervening years. 
23. Holt II, 309 F.Supp. at 373. 
24. Id. 
25. See id. at 383–84. 
26. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). 
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to impose a structural remedy.27 In the typical prison conditions case, once it 
found a violation of the Constitution, the court would enter a prohibitory 
injunction to stop cruel and unusual punishment or a mandatory injunction to fix 
the conditions of confinement so they would no longer be unconstitutional.28 
These injunctions would fail, for a couple of reasons. First, they were directed at 
large bureaucratic organizations with diffusion of responsibility.29 Second, the 
bureaucrats relied on the legislature for their funding, and the legislature placed 
prison funding low on their priority list.30 To make matters more difficult, the 
prison officials also had to contend with their employees, the correctional 
officers, whose actions contributed in a big way to the unconstitutional 
conditions. In some cases a court may be tempted to engage in in terrorem tactics 
to encourage compliance—threaten to release prisoners, take over the prison 
system, or impose taxes.31 These tactics have not proven successful.32 More 
successful are orders to keep records relating to conditions and to file periodic 
reports to the court.33 
Once the prohibitory injunction fails to bring about reform, the court 
recognizes that the problem is systemic and that the defendants not only need 
more specific direction but there is a need to restructure the institution.34 At this 
point, the court may well turn to a special master to evaluate reports to the court, 
investigate conditions, evaluate plans which the defendants may propose, and 
develop a court plan if the defendant’s plans prove inadequate.35 If these methods 
do not work, the court may appoint a receiver to take control of the prison 
 
27. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 7, 41 (1973). 
28. Some courts were more aggressive, such as Judge Justice in the Texas case, Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. 
Supp. 1265, 1391 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
29. See, e.g., id. at 1274 (concerning the practices of the Texas Department of Corrections, a state agency 
“responsible for the confinement and management of adult convicted prisoners of the State of Texas”). 
30. See, e.g., id. at 1290 (finding that the Texas legislature apportioned funding for prison staffing at a 
level significantly below the national average, resulting in a high ratio of prisoners to prison staff). 
31. See e.g. cases cited supra note 22 and accompanying text. See also Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 306 
(8th Cir. 1971); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 217 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (Holt III); Finney v. Ark. Bd. of Corr., 
505 F.2d 194, 207 (8th Cir. 1974); Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Finney v. Hutto, 
548 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 1977); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 697 (1978); Finney v. Mabry, 534 F. Supp. 
1026, 1045 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Finney v. Mabry, 546 F. Supp. 628, 637 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
32. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 311 
(2d Ed. 2008) (concluding that court decrees mandating specific prison policies are not effective because they 
are likely to be opposed by prison staff). 
33. See M. HARRIS AND D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN 
CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS: A CASE STUDY OF HOLT V. SARVER, NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 12–13 (1976) (courts, 
like the one in Holt, that include the defendant in the process of formulating remedies tend to produce solutions 
that are “considered correctionally sound and desirable”). 
34. See id. at 13 (describing how the court in Hamilton v. Schiro appointed experts to evaluate 
“corrections, medicine, architecture, and recreation” after the defendant failed to produce an adequate remedy).  
35. Id. 
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system.36 What order to enter, and when to enter it, was a matter committed to the 
court’s discretion, at least until passage of the PLRA. The California cases 
generally followed the pattern of the cases that preceded them.37 
Typically, the plaintiffs in structural injunction suits are represented by 
organizations with a mission.38 The model is provided by the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund (LDF), a pioneer organization that successfully pursued the goal of 
overturning school segregation laws and then requiring that the systemic 
discrimination in dual school systems be eradicated, “root and branch.”39 In 
California, the litigation for prison reform is led by the Prison Law Office, whose 
stated objective is a narrow one: “Our assistance is generally limited to cases 
regarding conditions of confinement.”40 While one might expect the Prison Law 
Office to embrace sentencing reform, the sentencing system is not its primary 
target. Instead, it is concerned with what happens to prisoners while they are 
serving their sentences.41 
Michael Vitiello’s paper describes Plata following a path similar to that 
taken in structural reform cases, as described in the two seminal writings about 
structural injunctions by Owen Fiss and Abram Chayes.42 Fiss and Chayes 
became the inspiration for further development by many scholars, most notably 
Paul Gewirtz and William A. Fletcher.43 Among the critics, the most influential 
has been Gerald Rosenberg.44 Rosenberg’s description of the “constrained” court 
takes note of the difficulties courts have in imposing politically unpopular 
remedies, especially when enforcement requires cooperation of reluctant 
bureaucracies.45 And experience demonstrates that the difficulties are multiplied 
 
36. See id. at 18 (describing how the mere suggestion of extreme measures such as federal receivership 
can improve state compliance with federal court directives).  
37. See, e.g., Coleman v. Brown, 922 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1014 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (imposing specific 
requirements for prison population reduction).  
38. See Stephen L. Wasby, Race Relations Litigation in an Age of Complexity 2 (1995) (describing how 
civil rights organizations often act as a conduit for public opinion).  
39. Id. at 9; Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
40. Prison Law Office, About Us, PRISONLAW.COM, http://www.prisonlaw.com/about.html (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).. 
41. Id.  
42. See generally Fiss, supra note 1, at 1; Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term—Foreword: 
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV.L. REV. 4 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, The Burger 
Court]. 
43. See generally Paul Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three 
Doctrines, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 46 (1976); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: 
Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982). 
44. See David Schultz & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Legal Functionalism and Social Change: A Reassessment 
of Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 12 J.L. & POL. 63, 65 (1996) 
(detailing the importance of Rosenberg’s work to political scientists). 
45. ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 313. 
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when the court must rely on the political branches for implementation of their 
decree.46 
Another notable aspect of the structural injunction is that it may require state 
officials to act contrary to state law, even though the state law, standing alone, is 
constitutional.47 Thus, prisoners sentenced according to state law may see their 
sentences reduced even though the sentences were constitutionally valid when 
imposed.48 In the course of disapproving a district court order imposing increased 
property taxes to help finance a school desegregation decree, the Supreme Court 
relied on the existence of a less intrusive alternative: an order to “levy property 
taxes at a rate adequate to fund the desegregation remedy.”49 The clear 
implication is that, where necessary, the court may order the defendant to levy 
taxes beyond those authorized by state law. Such an order would either require 
the legislature to adopt a new tax law or require the executive to levy a tax. 
The Court in a prison conditions case typically avoids rewriting sentencing 
rules and leaves it up to the state officials to determine how best to reduce prison 
population.50 While sentencing is individuated, reduction programs may be 
wholesale in nature, with the details of reduction relegated to bureaucrats.51 In 
California, the court orders led in 2009 to adoption of SB 18,52 expanding good 
time credits, and changing the parole system in order to reduce prison population, 
in response to the court’s orders.53 
 
46. Few, if any, courts willingly cite a governor or legislature for contempt when they refuse to 
implement a decree. This has been the case in Brown v. Plata. For example, after remand, when the state 
persisted in its resistance to prison population reduction, the court observed: “Because of the State’s resistance 
to complying with that decision, and in order to avoid the necessity of contempt proceedings against the 
Governor and other state officials, this Three-Judge Court has repeatedly declined to initiate such proceedings 
and has even sua sponte extended the time for defendants to comply with the Population Reduction Order 
issued in conformity with Brown v. Plata.” Brown v. Plata, Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay June 20, 
2013, No. C01–1351 THE (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Three-Judge Court, July 3, 2013). The court acknowledged 
that it could legitimately hold the state in contempt, but instead it would order further steps, and “[f]ailure to 
take such steps or to report on such steps every two weeks shall constitute an act of contempt.” Brown v. Plata, 
Opinion and Order Requiring Defendants to Implement Amended Plan, No. C01–1351 THE (E.D. Cal. & N.D. 
Cal. Three-Judge Court, June 20, 2013). Nonetheless, the court’s orders have profoundly changed prison 
conditions as well as leading to legislative changes described below.. 
47. See, e.g., Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 974–87 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (proposing 
various changes to California’s criminal justice system, not because they would cure specific unconstitutional 
practices, but because they could alleviate an unconstitutional, systemic level of prison overcrowding).  
48. See id. at 982 (discussing a diversion program whereby “low-risk offenders” would be released from 
state prisons to participate in “community correctional programs”). 
49. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990). 
50. See, e.g., Coleman v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1011 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (leaving it up to the 
defendant how to comply with the prison reduction order). 
51. See Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 974–87 (discussing system-wide reform measures that 
California officials could implement to achieve lower prison populations). 
52. 2009 Cal. Stat. ch. 28, § 36, at 29–30 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1228–1230); § 38, at pp. 39–40 
(amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933). 
53. SB 18 is described in Amanda Lopez, Coleman/Plata: Highlighting the Need to Establish an 
Independent Corrections Commission in California, 15 BERKELEY J. OF CRIM. LAW 96, 107–108 (2010). 
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Two years later the legislature adopted AB 109, which brought about so-
called realignment by shifting some prisoners to county jails.54 It did not do so by 
directly transferring prisoners from prisons to jails, but instead diverted incoming 
prisoners who would normally be sent to prisons to county jails.55 Realignment 
does not directly change the length of sentences, only where such sentences are 
to be served.56 According to the California Department of Corrections, no 
prisoners have been freed from prison as a result of realignment.57 The court also 
ordered some expansion of good-time credits and new parole processes for 
elderly persons who have served at least 25 years and for non-violent second 
offenders.58 These measures could result in earlier release of some prisoners. The 
state will only need to consider direct prisoner releases as a population reduction 
method if it fails to produce a sufficient prison population production with 
realignment.59 
The reduction order may hang as a sword of Damocles above the heads of 
the governor and legislature; however, rather than hanging by a horsehair it is 
supported by a rope. In an early prison case, a federal district court judge ordered 
the prison officials to use good time credits, parole, and furlough programs to 
relieve overcrowding.60 The Fifth Circuit reversed because the order 
“unnecessarily invade[d] the management responsibility of state officials.”61 It 
later clarified that such a specific order might be justified if inmate population 
increased “beyond the number authorized by the space requirements of the 
decree.”62 
The typical structural injunction, unlike ordinary bipolar litigation, directly 
affects non-parties.63 In the school desegregation cases, the structural injunctions 
 
54. 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 15, § 1, at 7 (defining the act as the 2011 Realignment Legislation). 
55. See 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 15, §§ 3–633 (redefining sentences for hundreds of crimes by changing the 
location of imprisonment from state prisons to county jails). 
56. See 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 15, §§ 3–633 (changing the location of where terms of imprisonment are to be 
served).  
57. 2011 Public Safety Realignment Fact Sheet, 3, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/realignment-fact-sheet.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
58. Brown v. Plata, Opinion Re: Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension 
of December 31, 2013, Deadline, No. C01–1351 THE (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Three-Judge Court, Feb. 10, 
2014, at 3). 
59. Id. 
60. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265, 1283–85 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (finding that good time credits, 
parole reform, and work release were methods by which overcrowding in Texas prison could be reduced and 
that, by failing to take these measures, state authorities had failed to take adequate measures to address the 
problem of overcrowding).  
61. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1148 (5th Cir. 1982). 
62. Ruiz v. Estelle, 688 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1982). 
63. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282–84 
(1976) (noting that traditional litigation was “bipolar,” “retrospective,” “self-contained,” “party-initiated[,] and 
party-controlled,” with a direct relationship between “right and remedy”). By contrast, he said, public law 
litigation was characterized by “sprawling and amorphous” party structure that is subject to change over the 
course of the litigation; negotiating/mediating processes; “judge [as] the dominant figure in organizing and 
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issued by the Court affected white students, teachers of every race, bus drivers, 
and even whole communities whose schools may be closed or enlarged by the 
decree;64 none of these groups are a party to the typical school desegregation 
case. So it is not surprising that the remedies for widespread denial of adequate 
medical care, including mental health care, might affect non-parties. The cap on 
prison population affects prisoners who are not members of the plaintiff class. 
The effect on members of the plaintiff class is not to transfer them or release 
them, but to create conditions within the prisons that meet constitutional 
standards.65 The relief also affects inmates in county jails, because the state relies 
on realignment to effect reduction in prison population. An influx of persons 
sentenced to more than a year’s imprisonment not only may lead to overcrowding 
in jails, but could expose pre-trial detainees and individuals convicted of minor 
misdemeanors to a tougher bunch of cellmates, depending on how realignment is 
carried out.  
It is reported that over a thousand prisoners in county jails—traditionally 
reserved for those sentenced to less than a year—are serving terms of five to ten 
years and that violence in jails has increased since realignment.66 The same article 
quotes the Monterey County Sheriff, who described realignment as “a masterful 
stroke by Governor Brown to shift all the state’s prison problems to county 
jails.”67 It seems clear that realignment results in release of some persons who 
would otherwise spend more time in jail.68 Realignment was one reason the 
voters were urged to adopt Proposition 30 in 2012.69 Proposition 30, which did 
 
guiding the case;” judge drawing on outsiders: “masters, experts, and oversight personnel;” judge as “creator 
and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief that have widespread effects on persons not before the court 
and require the judge’s continuing involvement in administration and implementation.” Id. at 1984. 
64. See Chayes, The Burger Court, supra note 42, at 5–6 (finding that by opening the door to “public law 
litigation,” the Court in Brown “committed the federal courts to an enterprise of profound social 
reconstruction.”).  
65. A recent text-book asks whether a judgment that results in releasing many non-class members 
[implicitly leaving most class members in prison] presents an Article III problem. The authors ask whether the 
class members face an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to a particular defendant. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., 
ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F. NOURSE, STATUTES REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND 
ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, 249, 241 (2014). Neither the Court’s opinion nor the dissent 
discuss this issue. 
66. Christopher Petrella & Alex Friedmann, Consequences of California’s Realignment Initiative, 
PRISONLEGALNEWS.ORG (June 2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/jun/12/consequences-
californias-realignment-initiative/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
67. Id. 
68. A highly publicized example is former California Senator Rod Wright, who was sentenced to 90 days 
in jail but served no time because the jails in Los Angeles are overcrowded. The sheriff’s office insisted that 
Wright was being treated the same as any other convict. In effect, the judicial sentence is subject to downward 
revision by the sheriff. Laurel Rosenhall, Rod Wright’s Jail Time Goes from Ninety Days to Less Than Ninety 
Minutes, SACRAMENTO BEE (last updated Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/ 
capitol-alert/article3509632.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
69. CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, WHAT WOULD PROPOSITION 30 MEAN FOR CALIFORNIA? 1 (Sep. 2012), 
available at http://calbudgetcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/120911_Proposition_30_BB.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
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pass, reads: “This measure gives constitutional protection to the shift of local 
public safety programs from state to local control and the shift of state revenues 
to local government to pay for those programs.”70 It is financed by a four-year tax 
increase on the wealthy.71 The decree potentially affects society at large, as the 
state addresses the population problem by either spending the taxpayers’ money 
on building new prisons or granting early release to some prisoners.72 Its effects 
on local governments prompted an organization representing them to file a brief 
supporting the state’s appeal.73 The law also affects prison guards, who will 
benefit if population reduction leads to more manageable prisons, but will be 
adversely affected if the lower population leads to lower demand for their 
services.74 “CCPOA’s members cannot adequately perform these duties given the 
current state of overcrowding. Based on its members’ experience with the day-to-
day realities of overcrowding and the resulting medical deficiencies in 
California’s prisons, CCPOA took the extraordinary step of intervening in the 
three-judge court remedial proceedings on the same side as the plaintiffs.”75  
At the same time, both separation of powers and notions of federalism have 
influenced the development of the structural injunction. Judges strain to avoid 
administering schools or prisons or institutions for the disabled, because those 
duties lie beyond their competency, because they are traditionally left to the 
executive branch, and because the power to regulate schools and state 
confinement institutions belongs to the states.76 To the extent that a case might 
 
70.  DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, CAL. GENERAL 
ELECTION, TUESDAY NOV. 6, 2012, 80 (2012), available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/ 
pdf/complete-vig-v2.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
71. See id. at 83 (establishing new income tax rates for individuals earning more than $250,000). 
72. Under realignment, parolees who violate the terms of their parole are to be sent to jail rather than 
prison, even if they have serious criminal backgrounds. Heather Tirado Gilligan, Prison Reform’s Unintended 
Consequences, CAL. HEALTH REPORT (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.healthycal.org/prison-reform’s-unintended-
consequences/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). It has been alleged that jail overcrowding leads to 
early release or even failure to incarcerate parole violators. Id. The Sacramento Bee reported that realignment 
had “disappointed advocates who had lofty hopes that counties would reduce California’s notoriously high rate 
of inmates who commit new crimes soon after hitting the streets.” Brad Branan, The Public Eye: Rearrest Rate 
Unchanged Under California Prison Realignment, SACRAMENTO Bee (last updated Oct. 7, 2014, 1:57 PM), 
http://www.sacbee.com/news/investigations/the-public-eye/article2588490.html (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). The story suggests that realignment was not accompanied by needed parole supervision or drug 
rehabilitation. Id.. 
73. Brief for the Cal. Ass’n. of Cntys., et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Brown v. Plata, 131 
S.Ct. 1910 (2011) (No. 13–198). The brief argued that public safety realignment created a “profound shift in 
prisoner management in California, which should be carefully considered before requiring additional prisoner 
releases,” and that “release of higher risk offenders jeopardizes public safety and burdens county resources 
dedicated to successfully implementing realignment.” Id. 
74. See Brief for Appellee Intervenor California Correctional Peace Officers’ Association at 3, 
Schwarzenegger v. Coleman, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (2011) No. 09-1233 (arguing that prison guards are “front line” 
officials administering services in California prison and suffering the impact of prison overcrowding).  
75. Id. at 2. 
76. See ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 308–10 (finding that judicial power to reform state institutions is 
limited by the power of state authorities). 
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implicate policy questions such as increased taxes, the purposes of confinement, 
construction of new facilities, assignment of personnel, and the like, courts have 
shown great reluctance to displace the state or local policy making apparatus.77 
They do so only as a last resort, when the defendants effectively punt to the court 
and abdicate their responsibility to carry out the court’s orders.78 
The law treats challenges to the validity of sentences and conditions of 
confinement separately—except, of course, that the state may not deliberately 
sentence an individual to cruel and unusual punishment or other unconstitutional 
treatment.79 State court judges, when they send convicted defendants to prisons, 
do not deliberately sentence them to cruel and unusual punishment or to 
deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law. As Herbert Wechsler 
and Jerome Michael wrote many years ago, “the criminal law . . . should serve 
the end of promoting the common good; and . . . its specific capacity for serving 
this end inheres in its power to prevent or control socially undesirable 
behavior.”80 Most of criminal law is committed to the state government, and the 
policy of how best to promote the common good is normally committed to the 
legislative and executive branches of government. The federal courts become 
involved when the state oversteps constitutional limits, but in remedying those 
cases they must take into account the proper role of the states and the other 
branches. State sentencing policy is not, without more, a proper matter for the 
federal courts.81 If the prisons were not overcrowded, the state would still be 
concerned with reaching the optimal balance in sentencing policy. If sentencing 
policies were perfect, there might still be overcrowded prisons, with attendant 
unconstitutional denial of minimally acceptable medical care and mental health 
care. 
Even if the prison conditions case does not lead to an order to release 
prisoners, one should not discount the impact of the court’s findings on public 
opinion and on public officials. Thus, a study of the Arkansas prison conditions 
litigation found: “Viewed from a broad perspective, the litigation touched several 
 
77. See HARRIS & SPILLER, JR., supra note 33, at 12 (finding that courts yield to state authorities on 
matters of policy detail). 
78. Id. at 13. 
79. See Chayes, The Burger Court, supra note 42, at 51–52 (1982) (describing analysis of cruel and 
unusual punishment within the context of prison practices litigation). 
80. JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION: CASES, 
STATUTES, AND COMMENTARIES 10 (1940). They then pose the question, about how convicted criminals should 
be treated and cite to “three major problems: (1) What methods are best adapted to the various ends of 
treatment; (2) to what extent do methods which serve one end of treatment also serve or disserve other ends; (3) 
if one end of treatment must be preferred over others, . . . what should be the order of preference among them?” 
Id. at 11–12. Michael Vitiello’s article underscores the complex policy issues of the balance between 
rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution; the governmental structure issues of state and local responsibility; 
and the political forces influencing sentencing policy. Michael Vitiello, Reforming California Sentencing 
Practice and Policy: Are We There Yet?, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV (2015) [hereinafter Vitiello, Reforming 
California Sentencing]. 
81. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687–88 n.9 (1977).  
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areas both within and outside the prison system. It caused an improvement in the 
management of the prison system while simultaneously creating administrative 
headaches.”82 The study quoted the Commissioner of the prison system as saying 
“that the litigation awakened the public to the need for change and, by depicting 
the court as a scapegoat, prison administrators were able to make necessary 
improvements . . . that the public might not otherwise have tolerated.”83 
Arguments in favor of California’s Proposition 47,84 which reforms some 
sentences, note that it will help relieve prison overcrowding, though they do not 
mention Brown v. Plata.85 
II. THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT 
The PLRA is reactive legislation, which its proponents described as 
correcting abuses in the relief in suits attacking conditions of prison 
confinement.86 It represents a pendulum swing from 1980, when Congress 
enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act and authorized the 
Attorney General to sue to remedy a pattern or practice of constitutional 
violations in prisons and other institutions.87 Fifteen years later, Congress was 
concerned, not with abuses in prisons but with remedies that members thought 
 
82. FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra note 2, at 748 .  
83. Id.. 
84. DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, CALIFORNIA 
GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY NOV. 4, 2014, 36, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/ 
pdf/complete-vigr1.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
85. See id. at 38. See also Lopez, supra note 53, at 120. Proposition 47 was approved on Nov. 4, 2014. 
DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE, NOV. 4, 2014, 14, available at 
http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2014-general/pdf/2014-complete-sov.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). It may lead not only to fewer people being sent to prison but also to release of some current prisoners. 
86. See Kyle T. Sullivan, To Free or Not to Free: Rethinking Release Orders Under the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act after Brown v. Plata, 33 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 419, 431 (2013). 
87. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (2012). Prison 
conditions litigation followed a trajectory similar to that of school desegregation litigation. See Shima 
Baradaran-Robison, Kaleidoscopic Consent Decrees: School Desegregation and Prison Reform Consent 
Decrees After the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Freeman-Dowell, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1333, 1334–35 
(2003). Initially, the private plaintiffs and the federal courts litigated these cases without federal executive or 
legislative intervention. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and 
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558–59 n.24 (2006). Then some federal courts discovered the 
“litigating amicus” end run around congressional silence, and they anointed a willing Attorney General with 
that title. The experience of the Attorney General in litigating these cases revealed the need for legislation, and 
Congress responded with Titles IV, VI, and IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [relating largely to schools] and 
the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, authorizing federal agencies to combat, through the 1964 Act, 
school segregation and, through CRIPA, unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Van Swearingen, 
Imprisoning Rights: The Failure of Negotiated Governance in the Prison Inmate Grevance Process, 96 CAL. L. 
REV. 1353, 1356, 1358 n.27, 1367 (2008). Success of litigation under these acts led to backlash, embodied in 
President Ford’s anti-busing law and in the PLRA. See Baradaran-Robison, supra note 87, at 1351; Lawrence J. 
McAndrews, Missing the Bus: Gerald Ford and School Desegregation, 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 791, 799 
(1997). Notably, however, neither act purported to deny the federal courts the ability to remedy structural 
constitutional violations. 
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went too far.88 “The appropriations bill in whose ‘fine print’ the PLRA was 
buried was enacted by a desperate Congress after months of budgetary crisis, and 
the PLRA’s sparse legislative history attests to the cursory review it received 
amid the clangor.”89  
Proponents of the PLRA argued that prison population caps and release 
orders had endangered public safety.90 Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson pointed to 
the murder of a classmate of hers by a prisoner who had been granted early 
release from a Texas prison, under a population cap in the Ruiz case.91 Senator 
Spencer Abraham of Michigan complained, “the result of such litigation is that 
violent criminals are freed to prey on more victims.”92 Former U.S. Attorney 
General William Barr testified: “Most pernicious of all, many courts were 
actually capping prison populations and forcing the turning-out violent predators 
back out onto the streets without any real analysis of whether this was essential to 
alleviate an unconstitutional condition.”93 Testifying on the same panel as Barr, 
John J. Diiulio, Jr. insisted “that while some prisons may indeed be overcrowded, 
and while overcrowding may create in some conditions a need for judicial action, 
the Nation’s streets are now overloaded with serious convicted criminals who are 
out on probation and parole. This is not a myth. This is a reality.”94  
Even after the PLRA was adopted, the chorus continued. Senator Orrin Hatch 
of Utah observed, “[t]he PLRA provides that prison population caps, which result 
in revolving door justice and the commission of untold numbers of preventable 
crimes, should be the absolute last resort.”95 A lawyer for the Pennsylvania prison 
system testified that the prison cap had resulted in over 50,000 defendants being 
 
88. See Sullivan, supra note 86, at 431 (describing the design of the PLRA to limit the instances in which 
federal courts may grant remedies in prison conditions cases). 
89. Id. at 433. 
90. See id. at 437–38 (citing the requirement enacted by the PLRA that courts must give great weight to 
any effects that remedies in prison cases may have on public safety). 
91. Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearing on S. 3, S. 38, S. 400, S. 866, 
S. 930, and H.R. 667 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 9–10 (1995) (statement of Sen. Bailey 
Hutchison). 
92. Id. at 4–5. 
93. Id. at 27. The Attorney General did not list the cases. Id. at 26–27. Elsewhere, he had bemoaned 
premature release of violent offenders, without linking release to prison conditions cases: “We all know that in 
many jurisdictions many violent offenders are not being sentenced to prison because of the lack of prison space. 
We know that in many jurisdictions violent offenders sentenced to prison are being paroled or otherwise 
released as early as possible because of space shortages.” William P. Barr, Attorney General, Remarks at the 
Attorney General’s Summit on Corrections: Expanding Capacity for Serious Offenders 4 (Apr. 27, 1992), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/04-27-1992.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
94. Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearing on S. 3, S. 38, S. 400, S. 866, 
S. 930, and H.R. 667 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 38 (1995) (statement of John . Diiulio 
Jr.). 
95. The Role of the U.S. Department of Justice in Implementing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2 (1996). 
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freed from pre-trial detention.96 She added that these defendants committed over 
10,000 crimes while free: “These included 79 murders, 959 robberies, 2,215 drug 
dealing cases, 701 burglaries, 2,248 thefts, and 90 rapes.”97 Experience under 
realignment, by contrast, shows no effect on the most serious offenses, but slight 
increases in other offenses, 3.4% in violent crimes, and 7.6% in property crimes, 
most notably 24,000 more stolen vehicles.98 
Section 802 of the PLRA is titled “Appropriate Remedies for Prison 
Conditions.”99 It begins by incorporating the equitable rules that the courts had 
fashioned for structural injunction cases: relief should go no further than 
necessary to correct the violation of rights of individual plaintiffs, should be 
narrowly drawn, and should use the least intrusive means necessary to remedy 
the violation.100 The same section requires the court to “give substantial weight to 
any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system 
caused by the relief,” a theme that echoes many prior court opinions.101 This is 
followed by yet another statement that courts would recognize as obvious: courts 
shall not “order any prospective relief that requires or permits a government 
official to exceed his or her authority under State or local law or otherwise 
violates State or local law” unless Federal law permits the relief, the relief is 
necessary, an no other relief is adequate.102 
In one of the first scholarly analyses of the PLRA Mark Tushnet and Larry 
Yackle observed:  
[S]ometimes, perhaps often, legislators enact statutes to make a point, or 
to be able to tell their constituents that they have done something about a 
problem. We call these symbolic statutes. Legislators may win politically 
by enacting symbolic laws, but courts, bureaucrats, and others affected 
by the statutes—here, criminals—may lose as they try to work out what 
the statutes mean. Symbolic statutes are real laws, posing real problems 
of interpretation and administration.103  
 
96. Id. at 48 (statement of Sarah Vandenbraak, Chief Counsel, Penn. Dept. of Corr.). 
97. Id. at 45. The Supreme Court took note of Philadelphia’s experience, citing testimony of District 
Attorney Lynne Abraham, but noted lack of documentation of the allegation and differences between the order 
in Philadelphia and the order in Plata. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1942–43 n.11 (2011). The Philadelphia 
case led to a consent decree in which the prison authorities agreed to reduce the number of prisoners in the 
Philadelphia prisons from 4,300 to 3,750. Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
98. Petrella & Friedmann, supra note 66. 
99. Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 802 (1997). 
100. Id. at § 3626(a)(1)(A). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at § 3626(a)(1(B). 
103. Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–3 
(1997). See also Sullivan, supra note 86, at 436 (“The lack of precise meaning in the PLRA’s terms renders it 
little more than a flaccid judicial test that allows prisoners’ constitutional rights to hang in the balance.”). 
2014 / Does Prison Reform Bring Sentencing Reform? 
762 
Perhaps no provision more tellingly functions as a symbolic statute than 
§3626(a)(1)(C): “Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the 
courts, in exercising their remedial powers, to order the construction of prisons or 
the raising of taxes, or to repeal or detract from otherwise applicable limitations 
on the remedial powers of the courts.”104 This provision effectively says nothing. 
For there is no other language in the act that could possibly be construed as 
authorization to issue such an order. Yet, while the provision sends negative 
vibrations regarding orders to construct prisons or raise taxes, it does not limit the 
ability of courts to enter such orders.105 In any event, courts have not typically 
entered such orders. This provision’s rhetoric and emptiness resembles Congress’ 
response to criticism of some school desegregation decrees. Congress placed in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 this “limit” on federal court jurisdiction: “nothing 
herein shall empower any official or court of the United States to issue any order 
seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation 
of pupils or students from one school to another . . . in order to achieve such 
racial balance . . . .”106 Illustrative of the meaninglessness of the provision is the 
phrase “pupil or student” without providing any clue as to whether the two words 
were referring to two different types of person.107 The Supreme Court held that 
the provision had no impact on the ability of courts to issue race-based orders 
requiring busing to achieve a unitary school system;108 the courts had not sought 
to issue such orders to achieve racial balance. 
The provision that is most relevant to sentencing reform is §3626(a)(3), titled 
“Prisoner Release Order.” The PLRA defines a prisoner release order as one that 
has “the purpose or effect” of “reducing or limiting the prison population” or 
“that it directs the release from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison.”109 In 
other words, “prisoner release order” refers to two distinct types of order. One 
type of “prison release order” does not require the release of prisoners.110 Further 
confusing the issue, transfer of prisoners from state prisons to county jails would 
not fall within the definition of prison release order, because “prison” is defined 
as a government facility that incarcerates or detains “juveniles or adults accused 
of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 
criminal law,”111 so that jails come within the definition of prison. As far as the 
 
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(C) (1997). 
105. See 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(1)(C) (West 2006) (neither granting nor denying courts the authority to 
order the construction of prisons or the raising of taxes).  
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1997). 
107. Id. 
108. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 17–18, 30 (1971). 
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4) (1997). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. § 3626(g)(5). 
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PLRA is concerned, transfer from prison to jail is a transfer from one prison to 
another.112 
Section 3626(a)(3) perfectly illustrates how the PLRA buttresses the 
structural injunction in prison cases.113 It provides that only a three-judge court 
may enter a prison release order and grants state and local officials and units 
broad authority to intervene to oppose the imposition or continuance of prison 
release relief.114 Implicit in the section is the acknowledgment that a prison 
release order may be entered, so long as a three judge court enters it. In addition 
to these procedural changes, this section requires that the court have tried less 
intrusive relief for a reasonable amount of time before considering prison 
release.115 Finally, the court may enter prison release relief only if it finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that “(i) crowding is the primary cause of the violation 
of a Federal right; and (ii) no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal 
right.”116 
The legislative history of the PLRA is sparse, due perhaps to its inclusion as 
Title VIII of a much longer bill. The PLRA originated in a bill ominously titled 
the Violent Criminal Incarceration Act of 1995.117 Title III of that bill, bearing the 
title Stop Turning Out Prisoners, would have provided:  
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, the court shall not 
grant or approve any relief whose purpose or effect is to reduce or limit 
the prison population, unless the plaintiff proves that crowding is the 
primary cause of the deprivation of the Federal right and no other relief 
will remedy that deprivation.118  
The Department of Justice had no objection to a provision barring population 
limits that were not necessary to remedy the violation, but expressed concern 
about the “primary cause” provision, noting that 
It would be exposed to constitutional challenge as precluding adequate 
remedy for a constitutional violation in certain circumstances. For 
example, severe safety hazards or lack of basic sanitation might be the 
primary cause of unconstitutional conditions in a facility, yet extreme 
overcrowding might be a substitute and independent, but secondary, 
cause of such conditions. Thus, this provision could foreclose any relief 
that reduces or limits prison population through a civil action in such a 
 




116. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E). 
117. H.R. 667, 104th Cong. (1995) 
118. Id. 
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case, even if no other form of relief would rectify the unconstitutional 
condition of overcrowding.119 
Nothing in the legislative history contradicts this analysis.120 The 
Congressional Budget Office analysis of the bill observed: “While prison caps 
must be the remedy of last resort, a court still retains the power to order this 
remedy despite its intrusive nature and harmful consequences to the public if, but 
only if, it is truly necessary to prevent an actual violation of a prisoner’s federal 
rights.”121 As the Court recognized in the Arkansas prison case, a comprehensive 
order may be required because of “the interdependence of the conditions 
producing the violation.”122 While the bill as finally passed removes some of the 
proposed language, it retains the basic concept.123 While the conference report on 
the bill does not directly address the issue of prisoner relief, it explicitly 
recognizes the need for medical treatment of the 80,000 prisoners in our nation’s 
prisons who “suffer from severe mental illness.124 The conferees agree that the 
care and treatment provided to these individuals is essential to their health and do 
not intend for any of the provisions in this title to impact adversely on the 
availability of this care and treatment.”125 The obvious rejoinder to the claim that 
no relief other than prisoner release will remedy the violation is that if the 
violation stems from overcrowding the court could simply order construction of 
more prisons and could order that the state fund that construction. One might 
argue that that avenue is blocked by section 3626(a)(1)(C), which provides 
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to authorize the courts . . . to order 
the construction of prisons or the raising of taxes . . . .”126 However, as discussed 
earlier in this paper, that provision has no teeth. 127 If it did have teeth, it would 
mean that a court could order release from prison even if construction of new 
prisons would alleviate the overcrowding. 
 
119. 142 Cong. Rec. S2296–2300 (daily e. Mar. 19, 1996) (Statement of John Schmidt). On the other 
hand, Schmidt thought another provision, read narrowly, raised no substantial constitutional problems: 
“Proposed 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1) in the proposal goes further than the current statute in ensuring that any relief 
ordered is narrowly tailored. However, since it permits a court to order the “relief . . . necessary to remove the 
conditions that are causing the deprivation of . . . Federal rights,” this aspect of the proposal appears to be 
constitutionally unobjectionable, even if it constrains both state and federal courts.” Id. 
120. Id.; see also Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearing on S. 3, S. 38, S. 
400, S. 866, S. 930, and H.R. 667 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 9–10 (1995) 
121. H.R. Rep. No.104–21, at 18 (1995). 
122. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978). 
123. See generally Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1997). 
124. H.R. REP. NO. 104–378, at 167 (1995). 
125. Id. 
126. U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(C) (1997). 
127. Other provisions, not addressed here, define circumstances when preliminary injunctions are 
appropriate Id. § 3626(a)(2); place time limits on structural injunctions regarding prison conditions Id.; limit the 
use of consent decrees Id. 3626(c)(1); and regulate the use of special masters in prison conditions cases Id. § 
3626(f); and exempt state court decisions based on state law from the limits on court power. Id. § 3626(d). 
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In sum, the PLRA has three faces. It reads as a negative—a limit on judicial 
power. It strongly implies a positive—that federal courts do have power to 
fashion structural injunctions to remedy unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement. It operates as a precatory statute—courts are to take care not to rush 
into prisoner release orders.128 
III. BROWN V. PLATA 
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s order capping prison population 
at 137.5% of capacity and requiring the State of California defendants to 
formulate and submit for court approval a compliance plan.129 The order was 
entered only after the Court had for many years attempted to remedy 
constitutional deficiencies in inmate medical care and mental health care.130 As 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court majority, “[t]his case arises from serious 
constitutional violations in California’s prison system. The violations have 
persisted for years. They remain uncorrected.”131 The two dissenting opinions, by 
Justices Scalia [joined by Justice Thomas] and Justice Alito [joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts] disagreed both about the facts and about the construction of the 
PLRA.132 
The central problem in Brown v. Plata is the application of the principle that 
the scope of the remedy depends on the nature of the violation.133 As the dissents 
in Plata point out, most beneficiaries of early release are not members of the 
plaintiff classes—prisoners with serious mental disorders or other serious 
medical conditions.134 The Court majority undertook a two-part analysis: first, 
would the lower courts have authority to issue their order to reduce prison 
population if there were no PLRA, and, if so, did the PLRA withdraw that 
authority?135 
The majority’s conclusion on the first question follows well-established 
principles for structural injunction cases.136 As with all equitable relief, the 
 
128. Cf. William F. Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights 
Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613 (1991). 
129. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 1922, 
132. Id. at 1950–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
133. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). The Arkansas prison decision 
relied in part on Swann, noting that “[o]nce invoked, ‘the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy 
past wrongs is broad, . . . .’” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 287–88 n.9 (1978) (quoting Swann at 15). 
134. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1958, 1963. 
135. Id. at 1923. In an earlier phase of the case, the trial court observed, “[t]he Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), which governs this case, codifies the Court’s authority to issue 
prospective relief that fully remedies constitutional violations, while mandating that the relief not be overly 
broad.” Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01–1351 THE, 2005 WL 2932253, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005) (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
136. See Fiss, supra, note 1, at 3. 
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injunction may issue only if the court finds that the plaintiffs are suffering 
irreparable injury and that there is no adequate remedy at law.137 It is 
commonplace that systemic violations will generally require systemic relief, and 
that this relief will affect parties and non-parties alike. Generally, the court will 
begin with an order requiring the defendants to remedy the violation, leaving 
them to devise suitable remedial mechanisms.138 If the defendants fail to adopt 
effective remedial steps, the noose often tightens, with appointment of special 
masters or even receivers.139 The Plata Court noted that the order to reduce prison 
populations came after twenty-one years of litigation and twelve years of 
remedial efforts over the rights of mentally ill prisoners and ten years of litigation 
and five years of remedial efforts over the rights of those with other serious 
medical conditions.140 Thus, although cases challenging conditions of 
confinement may lead to a sort of indirect sentencing reform in the guise of an 
order to reduce prison populations, plaintiffs’ lawyers should not think that that 
relief will come quickly. It is pretty much a last resort. And, as the Court pointed 
out, the order did not require release of prisoners: it required the defendants to 
“formulate a plan for compliance and submit its plan [for reduction of 
population] for approval by the court.”141 
The dispute between the majority and the dissents also follows a familiar 
pattern, exemplified not only in scholarly discussions of the role of the federal 
courts but also in earlier Supreme Court decisions. One view holds that all courts 
exist to resolve disputes between parties, a plaintiff and a defendant.142 They 
resolve disputes by applying well settled rules, and relief is generally confined to 
damages or a narrow injunction defined with specificity. Anything beyond this 
unduly stretches the court beyond the legitimate exercise of power.143 Justice 
Rehnquist, for example, dissenting in the Arkansas prison cases, argued that an 
order limiting solitary confinement to 30 days “does nothing to remedy the plight 
of past victims of conditions which may well have been unconstitutional.”144 
Instead, it “grants future offenders . . . greater benefits than the Constitution 
requires.”145 The other view, of which Owen Fiss is the primary proponent, is that 
courts must give content to public values, must act proactively, and will need to 
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143. Id. 
144. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 712 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
145. Id. at 712. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, responds that the limit on isolation is 
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the litigation into account, the court was justified in entering a comprehensive order to insure against the risk of 
inadequate compliance.” Id., at 678. 
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enter into a long, close relationship with the parties in order to ensure that the 
defendants respect the public values that govern the case.146 
Justice Scalia’s dissent attempts a broadside attack on the structural 
injunction, arguing that this kind of relief is beyond judicial competence and 
leads to judges imposing policy preferences on the state.147 He buttresses his 
objection by noting that the relief depends upon empirical predictions, which he 
says are “necessarily based in large part upon policy views.”148 The crux of his 
critique is: “[S]tructural injunctions depart from [the] historical practice, turning 
judges into long-term administrators of complex social institutions such as 
schools, prisons, and police departments.”149 Ironically, Justice Scalia is here 
engaging in the very practice he criticizes: reaching his legal conclusion based 
upon his policy views.150 Those views conflict with the PLRA, which, while 
placing limits on the judicial imposition of structural injunctions, explicitly 
exempts from those limits relief that “is necessary to correct the violation of a 
Federal right”151 so long as the relief “is the least intrusive means necessary to 
correct the violation of the Federal right.”152 Indeed, the PLRA also explicitly 
allows the court to order release of prisoners as a last resort,153 and authorizes the 
court to appoint a special master if “the remedial phase will be sufficiently 
complex to warrant the appointment.”154 Justice Scalia’s emphasis on remedying 
individual rather than structural violations seems to lead to the remarkable 
conclusion that if the only remedy for denial of constitutionally required medical 
treatment were an order to release a prisoner, the court should order that person 
released, no matter how dangerous the prisoner may be.155 Nonetheless, he 
concludes his dissent by saying, “[t]he PLRA is therefore best understood as an 
attempt to constrain the discretion of courts issuing structural injunctions—not as 
a mandate for their use.”156 Underlying his opinion is his acknowledged 
disagreement with the Court’s “evolving standards of decency” jurisprudence, 
upon which recognition of a prisoner’s right to minimally adequate medical 
treatment is based.157 
 
146.  Fiss, supra, note 1, at 30.. 
147. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1951 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
148. Id. at 1954. 
149. Id. at 1952. 
150. See id. at 1951–59. 
151. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1997). 
152. Id. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 
153. Id. § 3626(a)(3). 
154. Id. § 3626(f)(1)(B). 
155. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1958 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting); ”Thus, if the court 
determines that a particular prisoner is being denied constitutionally required medical treatment, and the release 
of that prisoner (and no other remedy) would enable him to obtain medical treatment, then the court can order 
his release . . . .” Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 1951. 
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The other dissenters, by contrast, disagree with the district court’s fact-
finding process and with its findings that emerged from that process, and they 
argue that, under the PLRA, the facts do not support the order to reduce the 
prison population.158 In addition, they argue that the lower court should have 
allowed the state to offer evidence to show that the prisons no longer were 
violating constitutional rights to minimally adequate medical care, including 
treatment of mental illness.159 The majority responded that the issue before the 
lower court was the adequacy of the remedy for the violations the court had 
found, and that the court did take evidence on that issue;160 in any event, the 
evidence on remedy reflected a continuing violation. 
IV. THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED IN PLATA161 
Tushnet and Yackle correctly predicted the Court’s approach to interpreting 
the PLRA. “In the main, however, courts will reconcile symbolic laws with the 
prevailing order . . . [C]ourts are likely to read . . . the PLRA to make only 
modest adjustments to the policies the judiciary had already adopted. The effect 
is that the new laws will have no systematic first-order effects . . . The statutes’ 
redundancy in practice may keep the issues that their sponsors purported to 
address alive and available for further political exploitation.”162 
The PLRA should be construed with three basic points in mind: (1) the scant 
legislative history of the act suggests that limits on the courts’ authority should 
be narrowly construed; (2) separation of powers requires that the statute be 
construed in a manner consistent with the judiciary’s traditional equitable and 
constitutional powers as expressed in the judicial development of the law of 
structural injunctions; and (3) construction of the statute should take into account 
the status of prisoners in our society. Prisoners’ rights are a paradigm of 
unpopular rights that the elected branches are unlikely to protect. Courts are the 
main protector of prisoners. While not mentioned in the Carolene Products note 
four,163 prisoners constitute a discrete and insular minority, and an unpopular and 
disenfranchised one.  
One may compare experience under the PLRA with experience under the fair 
employment law. That law protects all of us against discrimination based on race, 
religion, sex, national origin.164 The Court has narrowly construed the fair 
employment law’s protections, and Congress, prompted by a broad coalition of 
 
158. Id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
159. Id. at 1959–60. 
160. Plata 131 S. Court at 1935–36. 
161. See also Lauren Salins & Shepard Simpson, Note, Efforts to Fix a Broken System: Brown v. Plata 
and the Prison Overcrowding Epidemic, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1153, 1183 (2013). 
162. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 103, at 84–85. 
163. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). 
164. 78 U.S.C. § 703(a)(1) (1965). 
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advocacy groups, has amended the law to overturn the narrow constructions.165 
Contrast this with prisoner rights. No such interest group coalition will support 
relief that is seen as “gambling with the safety of the people of California.”166 
Even where disclosures of cruel and unusual conditions shock the public, 
meaningful legislative or executive remedial steps are unlikely. This fact is 
illustrated by the course taken by the political branches after the courts in this 
case revealed the scope of the intolerable conditions that prevailed in the 
California prison system. It was the inability of California’s political branches to 
coalesce around meaningful remedial steps that led to ever more intrusive orders 
from the Court. This is the typical pattern in cases of systemic cruel and unusual 
treatment in prisons. In California, the pattern was initially reinforced by the 
political power of the correctional officers, although Professor Vitiello notes that 
they have more recently supported some reforms.167 
Does realignment under A.B. 109 require “the release from or nonadmission 
of prisoners to a prison?” Realignment simply shifts “criminals who had 
committed ‘non-serious, non-violent, and non-registerable sex crimes’ from state 
prisons to county jails.”168 The injunctions in Brown v. Plata do not explicitly 
require the release of prisoners, although the Supreme Court majority did suggest 
that the lower court might usefully order the State to “develop a system to 
identify prisoners who are unlikely to reoffend or who might otherwise be 
candidates for early release.”169 The dissenters seem to have assumed that the 
effect of the district court’s order was to require release of prisoners.170 For 
example, Justice Alito referred to “the effect of the massive prisoner discharge on 
public safety,”171 while Justice Scalia impressively characterizes the order as 
“granting the functional equivalent of 46,000 writs of habeas corpus.”172 The 
record does not substantiate either statement, and it seems necessary to turn to 
other sources to find out what the actual effect of the order has been. In any 
event, the “purpose or effect” language in the definition refers to the purpose or 
effect of limiting prison population; it does not apply to the second phrase, 
“directs the release from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison.”173 In his 
unsuccessful request to the Supreme Court to revisit the case in 2013, Governor 
Brown argued that realignment had taken the less dangerous prisoners from the 
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prison population and that the lower court’s order would require early release of 
dangerous prisoners.174 
Realignment now is the law of California, so it is arguable that whatever 
“releases” stem from realignment result from state law, not from the federal court 
order. Realignment does not release persons from state prison, but it sends to jails 
convicts who otherwise would have been sent to prison, including parole 
violators.175 
Ordinary equitable doctrine supports the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction to 
issue a structural injunction in order to remedy a constitutional violation. To the 
extent that the PLRA is meant to interfere with the exercise of that discretion, 
three related principles require narrow construction. Courts should seek to find 
the statutory meaning that avoids the necessity to decide whether the statute is 
constitutional.176 Jurisdiction stripping legislation raises issues of separation of 
powers and may be unconstitutional.177 Finally, Congress may not restrict 
jurisdiction in a manner that denies the underlying constitutional right.178 
Moreover, Congress has generally taken care not to displace jurisdiction of courts 
to remedy constitutional rights. Thus, Congress has rejected proposals to restrict 
jurisdiction to protect separation of church and state, the right to an abortion, 
busing as a desegregation remedy, and enforcement of the Miranda decision.179 
This Congressional sensitivity to the constitutional role of the courts is another 
reason to assume that Congress did not intend to so trammel judicial discretion as 
to deny constitutional rights. Beneath the surface lies another possible reason to 
construe such statutes narrowly. The law may reflect a desire of members of 
Congress, all elected, to deflect to the federal courts public criticism of federal 
intervention. Judge Frank M. Johnson once referred to the tendency of elected 
officials to “punt” difficult political issues to the courts.180  
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And, as he noted: 
We would be naïve to the point of being imbecilic if we didn’t realize 
that the decisions in a lot of these areas have social and political 
repercussions. But I suppose that was one of the reasons, if not the main 
reason, federal judges were given tenure—so they could decide cases 
according to the facts and the applicable law without regard to whether it 
was a popular or unpopular thing to do.181  
That kind of rhetorical exercise appears in the PLRA, which provides “[n]othing 
in this section shall be construed to authorize the courts, in exercising their 
remedial powers, to order the construction of prisons or the raising of taxes, or to 
repeal or detract from otherwise applicable limitations on the remedial powers of 
the courts.”182 There is nothing in section 3626 that could be construed in the way 
the legislation says it shall not be construed.183 The provision is meaningless, but 
distances the Congress from any future orders that might require new prison 
construction or taxes. Notably, that provision is silent on the question of prisoner 
release orders.184 
V. CONCLUSION 
One cause of the unconstitutional deprivations of adequate medical care and 
mental health care in California was prison overcrowding.185 The causes of prison 
overcrowding can be stated simply: supply of prison capacity is lower than the 
demand created by California’s criminal justice system. That demand is a 
function of the incidence of crime, arrest decisions, prosecutor charging 
decisions, sentencing law, the exercise of judgment by the courts, and the 
operation of good time credits and parole decisions. Neither the supply side nor 
the demand side of this equation is directly in issue in a case challenging the 
constitutionality of prison conditions. It matters not whether demand is high or 
whether supply is low. What counts is whether the prisons offer their inmates 
minimally adequate conditions of confinement. But when the inadequacy of the 
conditions stems in part from the imbalance between demand and supply, the 
court may be forced to address one or both sides of the equation.186 Congress 
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appears to have concluded that addressing the demand side is less problematic 
than addressing the supply side, since the latter will strain state budgets and could 
lead to higher taxes.187 
It is, however, inevitable that an order requiring that prison population be 
kept no larger than a stated percent of prison capacity will result either in an 
increase in capacity or a decrease in prison population. Capacity can be increased 
either by building new prisons or by using existing facilities outside the prison 
system. Realignment provides bargain basement increase in capacity. It remains 
to be seen whether it is good policy. Since realignment did not reduce the prison 
population to the level required by the court, further proceedings led to the state, 
acting under pressure from the court, adopting new measures that could result in 
release of prisoners and sentencing reform:  
a ‘Compliance Officer’ who will have the authority to release prisoners 
should defendants fail to reach one of the benchmarks, with the number 
of prisoners released being the number necessary to bring defendants into 
compliance with the missed benchmark. Further, during these two years, 
defendants have agreed to develop comprehensive and sustainable prison 
population-reduction reforms, including considering the establishment of 
a commission to recommend reforms of state penal and sentencing 
laws.188 
The defendants in Plata confronted a political problem often seen in 
structural injunction cases. In order to remedy the structural violation of the 
Constitution it is necessary to change an entrenched structure. Thus, after Brown 
v. Board of Education required the dismantling of the apparatus of racial 
segregation in the public schools, many Southern officials chose to ignore the 
law rather than take the politically unpopular steps that Brown required.189 In 
Alabama this led to the entry of the first statewide structural injunction, requiring 
state officials to take affirmative steps to desegregate the public schools of the 
state.190 The case evolved over time, with the United States, as plaintiff-
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intervener, monitoring compliance and proposing plans for desegregating 
students, consolidating schools, merging athletic associations, reassigning 
teachers, merging transportation routes.191 When Judge Frank M. Johnson, one of 
the three judges in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, considered later 
cases involving conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities and prisons, his 
experience in Lee influenced his remedial rulings.192 
Experience under Plata suggests that Fiss’s vision of the structural injunction 
remains alive and that Rosenberg is wrong in suggesting that prison conditions 
litigation is constrained where political and social support are lacking193 and that 
courts lack implementation power. The defendants in Plata until recently fought 
fiercely against the district court’s orders, but the court orders have brought 
significant change to the California prisons.194 The court orders may also have 
influenced public opinion regarding the need for prison reform, by appealing to 
what Edmond Cahn called “the public sense of injustice.”195 One author 
concludes that Brown v. Plata means: “human dignity and public safety go 
together; one cannot flourish without the other.”196 Perhaps the strongest 
recognition of the legitimacy and power of the structural injunction comes from 
the Congress’ enactment of the PLRA. In the face of congressional unhappiness 
over some of the orders in prison conditions cases, Congress carefully preserved 
the core of the structural injunction in legislation that was touted as limiting the 
courts. 
Although weak in the context of prison conditions reform, Rosenberg’s 
argument gains salience in the context of sentencing reform.197 If a prisoner’s 
rights organization believes that sentences are unjust, the lack of clear 
constitutional rules governing sentencing bodes ill for efforts to reform 
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sentencing by litigation, whether in prison conditions cases or elsewhere.198 As 
Rosenberg puts it, “The political challenge must be faced directly,” rather than 
through litigation.199 Sentencing reform simply to alleviate prison overcrowding 
is likely to neglect reforming the shortcomings of the sentencing system and 
instead put in place blunt measures.200 Of course, if reform through the political 
process fails the organization seeking reform may have to turn to prison 
conditions litigation—but that should ordinarily be a last resort. 
The prisoner’s rights organization that pursues sentencing reform through 
litigation to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions may also find that the 
sentencing reform remedy is short-lived. The Supreme Court has ordered that 
once the systemic violation of constitutional rights has ended, the court must 
dismiss the case, absent a showing of continuing threat of violation.201 The trial 
court in Plata has “consistently demanded a “durable” solution to California 
prison overcrowding.”202 Its orders, however, may not be durable. Perhaps the 
greatest contribution the court may have made would be the creation of a 
sentencing commission, but at this point all we have is a commitment by the 
defendants to “consider” one. If California creates a sentencing commission with 
teeth, then we can say that Brown v. Plata did play an important role in 
sentencing reform.203 
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